For a long time, North Korea was seen as merely a satellite of China—a sort of nuclear-armed little brother. But it was a useful one: useful for bothering the United States, for maintaining constant pressure on South Korea and Japan, and as a buffer zone between the American military and the Chinese border. However, this old view is no longer sufficient. Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea on June 8 and 9, 2026 (his first in seven years) is not just a socialist friendship trip; rather, it marks a deeper moment: China does not want to lose Pyongyang to Moscow.
According to Reuters and KCNA, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un expressed their intention to expand cooperation across political, economic, cultural, agricultural, technological, and commercial spheres. The language is classic, almost ritual. But the context is not. Since the war in Ukraine, North Korea is no longer just dependent on China. It has grown closer to Russia. It has regained strategic value. It can supply equipment, labor, and political support. In return, it can hope for energy, technology, wheat, money, and possibly sensitive transfers from Moscow. This shift changes everything. Kim Jong-un is no longer just beholden to Beijing. He can play Beijing against Moscow. That is precisely what China does not want. China likes useful allies, but it does not like uncontrollable ones.
North Korea is both useful and uncontrollable. It lets Beijing complicate American decisions in Asia but could also spark a crisis China wants to avoid. A missile launch, nuclear test, or provocation in the Yellow Sea or near South Korea can serve Pyongyang’s interests but embarrass Beijing. North Korea is therefore both a lever and a risk. Xi Jinping’s visit must be read in light of this contradiction. Officially, Beijing and Pyongyang speak of historic friendship, cooperation, and regional stability. The leaders used symbols of the relationship, notably references to the Korean War. But behind the ceremonies is a concrete question: Who still influences Kim Jong-un?
China knows the answer is no longer obvious. For years, Pyongyang depended on Beijing for trade, energy, and survival. Now, Russia offers a second door. While this does not replace China, it gives Kim room to maneuver—a small but meaningful shift in geopolitics, where even limited autonomy can move a vassal toward independence. This makes the visit important: Xi is not just there to congratulate Kim. He comes to remind him that China remains the central power on the Korean Peninsula.
This is also about hierarchy. Beijing does not necessarily want a weak North Korea; it wants a dependent North Korea. There is a difference. A weak Pyongyang can still be useful if it remains within China’s orbit. But an autonomous Pyongyang, backed by Moscow and encouraged by global disorder, becomes more difficult to manage. For China, the nightmare is not simply North Korean instability. It is North Korean unpredictability combined with Russian influence. That would create a strategic actor on China’s border that Beijing cannot fully discipline.
Beijing wants to prevent North Korea from becoming a Russian military outpost in East Asia. A strongly Russian-aligned North Korea would pose problems for China: it would diminish Beijing’s influence, heighten the risk of provocations, and offer the United States, Japan, and South Korea further reason to deepen military cooperation. This situation is one of the most paradoxical effects of North Korea’s strategy. The closer Kim moves to Moscow, the more he draws Beijing back. The more he threatens, the more he is courted. North Korea’s economic weakness thus becomes diplomatic leverage. Pyongyang is poor, isolated, and sanctioned, but it has three assets: nuclear arms, a strategic location, and the capacity to provoke.
This is where Kim Jong-un’s strategy becomes clear. He does not need to be strong in the classical sense. He only needs to be indispensable, and impossible to ignore. In a normal diplomatic system, North Korea would be marginal. But in today’s world, where great powers are divided , Pyongyang becomes useful again. Moscow needs partners. Beijing needs buffers. Washington needs to contain escalation. Tokyo and Seoul need guarantees. Kim understands this perfectly. He does not dominate the game, but he knows how to raise his price.
Another striking element stands out: the nuclear question seems to have been publicly avoided during the summit. According to Reuters, official discussions focused mainly on bilateral cooperation, and North Korea’s nuclear program was not at the center of the public narrative. This could be read as calculated diplomatic silence. China does not officially recognise North Korea as a legitimate nuclear power, but it also does not want to open a political conflict with Kim on this subject. This silence is significant: it may indicate that Beijing prefers to manage the problem rather than solve it. The complete denuclearisation of North Korea has become less and less credible. Kim Jong-un sees his arsenal as his regime’s life insurance—giving up nuclear weapons would mean disarming in front of the United States, South Korea, and Japan. China knows this and therefore wants to avoid two scenarios: an overly aggressive North Korea and a destabilised North Korea.
Xi’s visit also has a Taiwanese dimension. Kim Jong-un reaffirmed support for the “One China” principle, according to North Korean reports relayed by Reuters. This is not a minor point. At this moment, Beijing wants to show its allies that it stands by its position on Taiwan. North Korea thus becomes a piece in a larger game—a factor in the US-China showdown in Asia.
There is also a message to Japan and South Korea. Every time Pyongyang becomes more aggressive, Tokyo and Seoul move closer to Washington. Every North Korean provocation strengthens the case for missile defence, military coordination, and even deeper trilateral cooperation with the United States. China knows this. It does not want North Korea to become the reason for a stronger American security architecture in Asia. This is the paradox for Beijing: it needs Pyongyang as a pressure tool, but if that tool is used too brutally, it produces the opposite result by reinforcing America’s regional alliances.
That’s why we should see this visit as a message to several audiences. To Washington, Xi signals China can shape the Korean Peninsula.
To Moscow, the message is North Korea is not your sole domain.
To Seoul and Tokyo, Beijing asserts its regional centrality.
To Kim: get closer to Russia, but you still need China.
The real question is: Does China still control North Korea, or is it simply seeking to limit Pyongyang’s autonomy? That may be the main issue. Beijing is still the dominant neighbour, supplier, and protector. But Kim Jong-un is no longer just a pawn. He increasingly exploits China–Russia rivalry, American fears, Japanese concerns, and South Korean vulnerability to enhance his leverage. Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang does not signal a tranquil alliance; rather, it signals an alliance that now requires maintenance, as it is no longer automatic. Previously, China kept North Korea close from economic necessity. In 2026, the country must win back its political influence. When great powers have to reassure allies, their control is clearly no longer absolute.
(Gilles Touboul is a geopolitical analyst and former international currency trader with expertise in Middle East and Asia)